In security shift, Japan eyes equal partnership with U.S.

The Japan Times : 20 April 2015

Under the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan is preparing to expand the scope of activities the Self-Defense Forces can engage in by passing a package of security bills being drafted and new defense guidelines with the United States that will allow its troops to help an ally under attack.

Later this month, Japan and the United States will revise the bilateral defense cooperation guidelines, which U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth claims will take the alliance to “the next level.”

Experts say the move is in response to the changing East Asian security climate, marked by the rise of China and a relative drop in the U.S. military’s regional presence, though Washington has asked for a more robust SDF.

The decision to enable Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense, long banned by the war-renouncing Constitution, will bring Japan “closer to being the equal partner of the United States under the alliance,” said former Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto.

Under the bilateral security treaty, the United States must protect Japan, while Tokyo’s obligations are limited to the provision of facilities and areas for use by U.S. forces, and joint responses to armed attacks in Japanese territories.

Due to its one-sided nature, critics, particularly those in the U.S., say the treaty gives Japan a “free ride,” notes Morimoto, the first nonpolitician to serve as defense chief.

Fully aware of the issue, Japan has for decades worked to repay the United States. Tokyo provides massive financial assistance to help cover the costs of U.S. bases in the country, and the SDF buys a many U.S.-made weapons.

This, however, “has not been enough to eliminate the one-sidedness,” Morimoto claims.
At the time of the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, Washington asked Tokyo to dispatch the SDF for support. But Japan refrained from any personnel contribution, limiting its assistance to financial support.

“The United States expressed disappointment, asking, ‘Why won’t the SDF come?’ ” recounts a Foreign Ministry official who was at the Japanese Embassy in Washington at the time.
The official stressed that it is essential to expand the roles the SDF is allowed to play to strengthen the alliance.

The U.S. has been consistent in its request for greater contributions from the SDF. Morimoto says Washington “repeatedly asked Japan to resolve the issue of collective self-defense” during his six-month stint as defense chief until December 2012 under the Democratic Party of Japan administration.

The planned security legislation will enable the SDF and the U.S. military to jointly use force if three conditions for collective self-defense are satisfied. The requirements were set last year.
Also planned is a permanent law that would allow Japan to more quickly send SDF troops overseas to provide logistic support to the U.S. and for a limited number of other operations.

To date, Japan has drafted and enacted an ad hoc law each time it has sent the SDF overseas, including when troops were dispatched to Iraq for reconstruction and other assistance purposes in the 2000s.

“Ad hoc laws take time to enact,” says Hideaki Kaneda, former commander of the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Fleet Escort Force. “A permanent law will allow (the SDF) to provide education and training in preparations for possible rapid dispatches.”

Under the current system, Morimoto says, the ad hoc laws have often frustrated the U.S. since they delay SDF dispatches and come later than similar contributions by other nations.

Under the envisioned permanent law, the SDF would engage in assistance activities outside the areas where “combat activities are actually being conducted.” The government is also expected to lift a ban on the SDF’s provision of ammunition to foreign forces.

Abe has repeatedly said there will be no change in the nation’s status as a peaceful nation. But some opposition lawmakers remain skeptical.

The security legislation “will lead to unlimited expansion of (Japanese) military assistance for U.S.-initiated wars,” Japanese Communist Party leader Kazuo Shii says. “It is war legislation, designed to let Japan join conflicts by exercising the right to collective self-defense.”

Analysts and officials point to China’s military buildup as a rationale for Abe’s security efforts.
U.S. government and military officials, including David Shear, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, have expressed their hopes the SDF and the U.S. military will carry out joint warning and surveillance activities in the South China Sea, where China’s presence is increasing.

Presently, the SDF does not engage in any such activity in the South China Sea.
But at an April 2 news conference, Adm. Katsutoshi Kawano, chief of staff at the SDF’s Joint Staff, emphasized the importance of the South China Sea, home to sea lanes crucial to Japan.

Where the SDF should conduct warning and surveillance operations is determined “depending on the security environment and needs of the time,” Kawano says, indicating his positive view on possible SDF activities in the area.

Sino-Japanese relations have only just begun to improve after hitting historic lows. Tensions still remain strong over history issues and the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which are also claimed by China.

Under the current situation, joint warning and surveillance activities between Japan and the United States in the South China Sea could provoke strong reactions from Beijing.

Former Defense Ministry official Kyoji Yanagisawa, who has also served as assistant chief Cabinet secretary, says that such joint operations would clearly show that Japan is helping with “moves to contain China.”

“We must fully recognize the risk of Japan becoming a target of (Chinese) attacks,” Yanagisawa, however, warns.

While making strenuous efforts to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, Abe’s government has made little headway in improving the country’s relations with both China and South Korea.

“His foreign policy has few features other than its reliance on the United States,” says lawyer Sayo Saruta, director of a foreign policy think tank in Tokyo. “I can’t see what he wants to achieve by enabling Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense.”

“The Sunagawa Ruling, the Japanese Government’s Pretext for Allowing the Collective Self-Defense, Was Ordered by the US”

Taro Yamamoto, Cabinet Member of Upper House, Diet Session Record  19 August 2015

This is the English translation of the Japanese Diet session debate between Abe government ministers and Taro Yamamoto, the opposite party member at Upper House. Yamamoto disclosed that The Sunagawa Ruling (Japanese supreme court case in 1959), which was the Japanese Government’s Pretext for Allowing the Collective Self-Defense, was ordered by the US ambassador of the time.

Yamamoto also noted that the US defense magazine published in May 2015 said that the US defense budget of 2016 had already taken Japan’s new Self-Defense measure into consideration (before the Diet pass the bill in September). He also referred to the article on Foreign Policy “Japan’s Expanding Military Role Could Be Good News for the Pentagon and its Contractors” (Please refer to the attached link at the bottom.)
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Taro Yamamoto:  This is Taro Yamamoto representing The People’s Life Party & Taro Yamamoto and Friends.  I would like to continue questioning the obvious, the topic we all know in Nagatacho but we never discuss.  This time, I would like to introduce another “request” by the US.

The image panel please.  (The image shown)

This panel shows material indicating the Supreme Court ruling on the Sunagawa incident, which became the legal precedent for allowing the Self-Defense Force to participate in collective self defense with the US, was made according to a request, an order, by the US.  It was quoted from the homepage of professor Asaho Mizushima, a constitutional scholar from Waseda University, with his permission.

(Chairman leaves his seat and director Masahisa Sato takes his seat)

In the Sunagawa ruling, though it might be redundant to describe it to you, in 1959, after the unconstitutional ruling was handed on March 30th against the US military base presence in Japan at the Tokyo District Court , the defense directly appealed to the Supreme Court, stepping over the District Court, in order to avoid affecting the new national security bill being negotiated at the time.  It’s called chouyakujyoukoku (direct appeal to the supreme court).  These chouyakujyoukoku cases are extremely rare, and this case is even rarer, there are only three cases including the Sunagawa incident in which it was initiated by the prosecutor.  Moreover it was a request by the US.

On March 30th, 1959, the day after the unconstitutional ruling by the Tokyo District Court against the US Military presence was handed, at 8 o’clock in the morning, the US Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II–as you all know, this is the nephew of General MacArthur — General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers–had met the Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama to inform that it is critical that the Japanese government act urgently to correct the District Court ruling and stressed the importance of directly appealing to the Supreme Court.

In turn, Foreign Minister Fujiyama said that he would like to recommend to permit the appeal in the Diet session starting right away at 9:00am in the same morning

Three days later, on 4/3, the prosecutor directly appealed to the Supreme Court.

Then, three weeks later, on 4/24, then Supreme Court Chief Justice Koutaro Tanaka reported to Ambassador MacArthur that according to Japanese law, it will take at least a few months to reach the verdict.  Just this very fact tells the state of the Japanese Supreme Court.  Why would he go all the way to make a report on such a thing, isn’t that odd?

But the major surprise comes after that.

This panel, you all probably know what it is already.  (Someone speaks)  Yes, that’s right, someone just said “telegram”.

It is from three months later, on July 31st, the image came from professor Asaho Mizushima’s home page, and it was made available as a result of the Freedom of Information Act request for the US National Archives by the former professor of Yamanashi Gakuin University Reiko Yukawa.  It’s an official telegram from the Embassy of the US in Tokyo to the Japanese Secretary of State, it reports the content of the story told by the Supreme Court Chief Justice Tanaka to the Deputy Chief of Mission William Leonhart, it’s a copy of it, and what I just showed you is the content.

Let me ask you, did you know of the existence of this document?  Starting from the Foreign Minister please.  I am sorry that it is an unannounced question, I apologize.

Foreign Minister (Fumio Kishida):  There have been many official documents being disclosed in the US.  My understanding is that the US generally refrains from commenting on them as well.  We consider that, as the Japanese government, commenting on those documents individually would not be appropriate.

Taro Yamamoto:  So you knew the existence of the document, is that right?

Foreign Minister (Fumio Kishida):  It has been indicated by some, along with the aforementioned document, that the Sunagawa incident was negotiated between Japan and the US during the screening process.  Regarding the allegation, we do not consider that there has been such a negotiation.  I do not think that your assessment that the direct appeal of the Sunagawa incident case to the Supreme Court was due to the request of the US is a correct one.

The document from March 31st was also brought up during a Committee of the House of Representatives.  We have reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affaires of Japan has conducted a reconfirmation process for the document, however, our record has shown that there is no such document existing in our archives.

Taro Yamamoto:  You are saying that there was no negotiation, and the US did not pressure for the direct appeal to the Supreme Court, but, the main point really should be that there is no such document probably means that they just threw it away.  Cause it came out of the US National Archive.  From the US Embassy official to the Japanese Secretary of State.  The content of the conversation between the Deputy Chief of Mission and Director Tanaka is noted here, right?

So the content, what was the content, it was like this.  The Chief Supreme Court Justice Kotaro Tanaka told the Deputy Chief of Mission William Leonhart that the verdict for the Sunagawa incident will be out by December and he is determined to place the focus, the focus of the litigation I assume,  to be a legal issue instead of the issue of facts, the hearing will begin during the beginning of September and be conducted twice a week, he believes that if he opens the Court in the morning as well as in the afternoon, he can finish it in three weeks, and, he stated that he hopes the agreement at the Supreme Court will bring about a virtual unanimity in order to avoid the minority opinions, which can disrupt the public opinion.

Some of you who are watching the streaming on the internet might be a little confused what was being said, basically, the Chief Supreme Court Justice had highly accurate info and he himself decided to share it with the US.  He utilized his position to the maximum , with tender loving care in colluding with the US in obtaining a necessary verdict all for the sake of realizing the Japan-US Security Treaty.

It’s the extraordinary story of the Japanese Supreme Court showing an extraordinary loyalty to US political manipulation, the legendary loyal dog Hachiko would be very proud.  And it’s right out of the US National Archive.  It’s written right here.  Isn’t it just appalling that you just deny it, YOU DO NOT KNOW?  You just say that there has been no fact like that in a matter of fact manner, that is how you answered.

And as the Chief Justice Tanaka predicted, on December 16th, 1959, with a unanimous decision of the 15 judges, Justice Tanaka handed the Sunagawa verdict himself ruling that the US bases on Japanese soil is constitutional.  By this verdict, the Tokyo District Court’s verdict ruling that the US bases were unconstitutional, so called Date verdict, was scrapped.

Really, as we hear so far, it remind me of Noble laureate in physics Shuji Nakamura stating that the Japanese judiciary is rotten, we’ve heard words like that often.  The fact that the Chief Supreme Justice himself took action in lightening speed to present what the US wishes demonstrates that the Japanese judiciary has been rotting for a while.  The Sunagawa verdict indicates that the independence of the judiciary in Japan is just a fantasy and it was a rotten verdict by those who were desperate for self-preservation.

Foreign Minister Kishida, I’ve already asked you at the beginning.  I’d like to ask again.  I want to ask just the part that applies here, this Sunagawa verdict, did you have the knowledge that the direct appeal of it was suggested by the US?

Foreign Minister (Fumio Kishida):  First, regarding the Sunagawa verdict, we have no confirmation of an existing document indicating the US involvement.

(The Director Masahisa Sato leaves his seat, The Chairman takes his seat)

And, in addition, there was a mention on the exchange between the Supreme Court and the Embassy of the US in Tokyo.  Since it was an exchange between the Supreme Court and the Embassy of the US in Tokyo, I am not certain if it is appropriate for me to comment, however, as far as I know, I believe that on May 9th, 2013, there was a deliberation at the Upper House Legal Affairs Committee stating that there was no documentation of indicated exchange in the Supreme Court.

Taro Yamamoto:  So, really, the truth about this nation is only available through disclosed information from overseas, right?  The thing is that when the State Secret law goes into effect it will get even worse, I think.

The Sunagawa verdict, which the government and the governmental party regard as the basis for allowing the collective self-defense, does not state anything about allowing the collective self-defense, does it?  The argument of the government and the governmental party makes no sense, it can’t be trusted and it is just incomprehensible from any point of view.  And the Sunagawa verdict, the Sunagawa verdict itself is such a fraudulent piece of work made by the demand of the US, forced through the direct appeal process by the request, demand and order of the US.  What I am saying is that it is not convincing at all to have such a rotten verdict as a basis, especially, when it doesn’t even talk about the very topic at all, in insisting that the act of collective self-defense is constitutional.

Professor Asaho Mizushima has noted that, the day after the verdict, Ambassador MacArthur had congratulated the Chief Justice Tanaka’s skill and statesmanship.  He said “statesmanship”, what does “statesmanship” mean?  Does selling his soul and striving to be as useful as possible mean having good statesmanship?  The thing is that there certainly is a force that sells its soul, engages in spy activities and has turned the Sunagawa verdict over.

How could we put our faith in such a verdict?  By the way, The Rockfeller Foundation was very intimate with Chief Justice Tanaka, inviting him to the US, helping him to build a network.  We can not possibly trust the Sunagawa verdict.

And, as the Japanese government itself admits, provisions of ammunitions, refueling aircrafts during start-up preparation for combat maneuvers and maintenance, which were all unconstitutional, have been deemed not unconstitutional, changing the interpretation of the Constitution, saying it’s not the same as joining military actions, this, also, was because of the needs and request by the US, right?

The government just jumps on any request, but none of the needs for the people who live in the nation are heard, but , it comes up with a myriad of creative ways to forward the demands by Mr. America, the US military or the multinational corporations.
So what’s America’s need regarding these bills.  It’s rebalancing. What do they mean?  They are talking about shouldering America’s burden.

I have a copy of Stars and Strips news paper from May 13th, 2015.  What does it say?  The US defense budget already takes Japan’s new Self-Defense measure into consideration.  The latest figure for the 2016 US budget already assumes that the new bills being pushed by the Japanese government will be enacted to provide defense for the allied nation.  So, the US reduced the numbers of military personal by 40,000.  Not only that.  The latest defense budget clearly shows reduction.  The one who shoulders the burden, that’s Japan.

Moreover, you’ve heard of the publication “Foreign Policy”, right?  The prestigious US foreign policy research magazine, Foreign Policy, had an article titled:  Japan’s Expanding Military Role Could Be Good News for the Pentagon and its Contractors.  What’s that all about?  It says that it doesn’t cost a penny and it makes tons of money.  Who’s making money?  The Japanese government can buy a bunch of new equipment.  And that is very good for the US defense industry.

F35, manufactured by Lockeed Martin based in Texas, and Assault Amphibious Vehicles for the Marines, manufactured by BAE Systems based in Northern Virginia — Japan is planning to purchase them.  The Japanese government also plans to buy Global Hawks made by Northrop Grumman.  Also, it is developing two Destroyers with Aegis Radar System and the missile defense system.  Foreign Policy says that they are made by Lockeed Martin.

We are completely used!  When will we stop being their ATM machine?

And as the Third Armitage Nye Report that I introduced this morning clearly stipulates, the national security bill, the war act, restart of the nuclear plants, TPP, the Act on the Protection of Specially Designaated Secrets, the Three Priniciples on Trensfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the Basic Act on Cybersecurity, the Development Cooperation Charter, all of them are requested by the US.  When will we stop being a US colony.  It must be now.

This war act, this American act by the US, for the US, the defense industry act for the defense industry by the defense industry, I am absolutely against it, there is no way other than scrapping it. Period.  With these words again, I would like to end our questions.

Thank you very much.

https://www.taro-yamamoto.jp/english/5304

Please also refer to:

“Japan’s Expanding Military Role Could Be Good News for the Pentagon and its Contractors”
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/16/japans-expanding-military-role-could-be-good-news-for-the-pentagon-and-its-contractors/?utm_content=buffer24684&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

 

Don’t weaken civilian control of SDF

The Japan Times: 26 February 2016
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This is a matter of concern because I observe some ex uniformed SDF officers are demagogues like Donald Trump.  (Please refer to the related post of the same day :  Tamogami's World: Japan's Top Soldier Reignites Conflict Over the Past )
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It has been reported that the Self-Defense Forces’ Joint Staff Office is demanding that civilian officials in the Defense Ministry’s internal bureaus delegate to it a significant portion of their power over deciding the SDF’s highest-level operation plan. If this were to take place, uniformed SDF officers’ power could become lopsidedly big, undermining a key layer of civilian control of the SDF’s operations.

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The Abe administration cannot be too careful in handling the demand by the Joint Staff Office, which is dominated by uniformed officers. The administration has already amended a Defense Ministry law to abolish the organizational supremacy of civilian defense officials over uniformed officers. The call by the Joint Staff Office, if accepted, carries the risk of significantly weakening the check of SDF officers by civilians, giving the former the upper hand in making decisions on the SDF’s operations.
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What’s at stake is the basic plan for SDF operations — which is classified under the state secrets law. The plan covers the coming five years, and undergoes a major revision in its third year but is also fine-tuned annually. The daily missions of the three branches of the SDF are carried out based on the basic plan. The Joint Staff Office takes into consideration the latest security situation surrounding Japan in operating the units of the SDF’s three branches.
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The next basic plan will have added significance because it will reflect the new guidelines on Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, which were updated by Tokyo and Washington last April, as well as the Abe administration’s security legislation enacted last year. The guidelines have removed the effective geographical boundaries of Japan’s logistic support for the U.S. military imposed under the 1997 guidelines, potentially expanding the scope of the SDF’s joint operations with American forces on a global scale. Under the security legislation, Japan can now take part in joint military actions with its allies in contingencies outside its territory and operate as called for by the guidelines, among other things. Given the nature of the SDF’s new basic plan, it should be worked out with the input of a wide range of views and opinions, and civilian officials in the internal bureaus should play an important role. To significantly reduce their power will risk adopting a plan from a narrow viewpoint that excludes relevant nonmilitary considerations.
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The revision of the law for the establishment of the Defense Ministry last June abolished the long-standing rule that required high-ranking civilian officials to assist the defense minister from a position superior to uniformed SDF officers, and the internal bureaus to which these civilian officials belonged, the Joint Staff Office and the staff office of each branch of the SDF have come to assist the defense minister as equals. As part of the change, the Bureau of Operational Policy, which was part of the internal bureaus and drafted basic policy, was abolished and its task was divided between the Joint Staff Office and the Defense Policy Bureau
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As a result, the Joint Staff Office, in place of civilian officials, came to have the sole power to devise operational plans of the maritime, air and ground branches of the SDF, and command and carry out the operations. But civilian officials still keep part of the power to develop the basic plan because they work out the defense minister’s instructions — on the basis of which the operational plans of the SDF’s three branches are crafted — and to ask the minister for approval for the operational plans. The Joint Staff Office is reportedly demanding that these powers still retained by civilian officials be delegated to it.
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Civilian officials in the Defense Ministry are said to be resisting the demand on the grounds that planning the SDF’s operations and commanding its day-to-day operations are different in nature and that the internal bureaus, which are dominated by civilian officials, legally have the function of general coordination in matters related to the SDF. They point out that the Defense Ministry law stipulates that the internal bureaus take charge of basic matters and coordination related to defense and surveillance as well as of the basic administrative matters concerning SDF actions.
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Chief of Staff Adm. Katsutoshi Kawano has this explanation: The Joint Staff Office is just seeking to sort out office work-related problems and not demanding delegation of power from civilian officials.
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While the prime minister, who is the chief commander of the SDF, and the Diet, which approves his defense-related major decisions, constitute the highest layers of civilian control of the SDF, the defense minister, directly involved in overseeing the operations of the SDF, is responsible for day-to-day control of the SDF. Since the defense minister alone cannot effectively control the SDF, civilian officials in the ministry play an important role in civilian control of the SDF. Uniformed officers may be experts on military affairs but may fail to take a wider perspective by concentrating on maximizing the effectiveness of military operations. Civilian officials have an important duty of correcting the views of uniformed officers if they turn out to be overly narrow.
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Japan’s modern history in the lead up to its World War II defeat in 1945 shows that the absence of civilian control of the military by politicians and government officials led the Imperial armed forces to make gravely erroneous decisions and to even effectively control the government, thereby playing havoc with the fate of the nation. The Abe administration should realize that accepting this demand by SDF officers could create a situation in which the defense minister and the prime minister are swayed by the opinions of uniformed officers, meaning they would effectively play a greater role than elected officials in making key decisions on defense.
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Most people in the West lack even a basic knowledge of current Japanese politics and the prominent role and influence the parliamentary league Nippon Kaigi (a nationalistic, historical revisionism, cult to the 1931-45 Empire of Japan) wields... 'Activists demand that Japan stop apologising for its war crimes. Politicians give speeches on why the status of the Emperor, reduced to a symbol after the war, must “be restored”. An adjacent museum says that far from brutalising much of Asia, Japan’s army was on a noble mission to liberate it from Western colonialism. Such views are deeply at odds with those outside Japan, but they hold sway among a large number of Japan’s politicians. About a third of the Diet [parliament] and over half the 19-member cabinet of Shinzo Abe, the Prime Minister, support them. All are members of the parliamentary league of Nippon Kaigi, Japan’s most powerful nationalist lobby. Mr Abe is its “special adviser”...“They have trouble accepting the reality that Japan lost the war,” says Setsu Kobayashi, a leading constitutional scholar and former member of the group. Mr Kobayashi says Nippon Kaigi is run by people who want to bring back much of Japan’s pre-war constitution, before it was rewritten during the American occupation of 1945-52. Nippon Kaigi’s supporters say the liberal constitution has emasculated Japan. Many despise the pacifist clause that neutered Japan’s armed forces.'

Tamogami's World: Japan's Top Soldier Reignites Conflict Over the Past

Asia Pacific Journal - Japan Focus : 1 November 2008

In 2008, an ex uniformed Self Defence Force officer, General Tamogami Toshio was dismissed from his post in the Defense Ministry, by publishing an essay expressed his opinion as historical revisionist which share the similar value with "Japan Conference".  Even after retirement, he kept expressing the problematic opinions and demagogues with false stories  (but supported by some nationalists), and challenged to become a politician (though failed).  A few days ago, he was investigated for graft scandal at the time of election campaign. In 2008, civilian control still existed so could dismiss Tamogami from his post. However, as I reported earlier, the government tend to weaken civilian control, yet Tamogami's like minded personnel exists in uniformed SDF bureaucrats.
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On October 31, 2008, General Tamogami Toshio, Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force [ASDF] Chief of Staff was abruptly dismissed from his post in the Defense Ministry, but allowed to retire with his full pension rather than be summarily fired. At a press conference several months earlier, Tamogami, who had also been the superintendent of the SDF Joint Staff College, publicly expressed contempt for a ruling by the Nagoya High Court that the Japanese military mission in Iraq was unconstitutional.

On this occasion, the outspoken General, widely known among his peers for provocatively hawkish views, crossed several more lines. He entered and won the top prize of 3 million yen ($30,000) in an essay contest sponsored by a large scandal-marred construction and real estate conglomerate, the APA Group, which required contestants to write on “The True Outlook for Modern and Contemporary History.” APA's President is Motoya Toshio, the author of historical works and a key figure in political organizations supporting the Komatsu Air Base in Ishikawa Prefecture (fronting the Sea of Japan). He has strong ties to former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and other rightist politicians, including Tamogami.  As far as is known, superiors in the Defense Ministry's chain of command did not carefully scrutinize Tamogami’s essay or any of the 94 essays submitted by ASDF soldiers. A notorious Nanjing atrocity denier, Professor Watanabe Shoichi, headed the panel of judges that awarded the prize. And the essays were apparently “solicited for the purpose of ‘steering Japan toward a correct understanding of history as an independent nation.’”

The views the General expressed did more than simply contravene the official positions of his civilian supervisors. By arguing that Japanese colonial rule was humane and legal, and that Japan was not an aggressor in World War II, Tamogami contradicted the constitution and the official government stance of apology to the nation’s that Japan had invaded before and during World War II. At the same time, he placed himself at odds with the political sense of most educated Japanese people. 

The governments of China and South Korea immediately condemned Tamogami’s views, as did Japan’s leading parliamentary opposition parties, who hoped to use the affair to topple the country’s new LDP Prime Minister, Aso Taro. Aso’s own controversial nationalist ideas on history and the constitution are similar to Tamogami’s, but as prime minister he fired the general and refrained from discussing his ideas. An unrepentant Tamogami, however, held his ground and reiterated that the Japanese “people had been misled by erroneous education” into thinking that their country once had a dark past. In his desire to free the Japanese military from constitutional restraints, Tamogami might have encouraged many senior and junior active-duty ASDF officers to join him in entering essays (of unknown content) in the same competition: the number varies from over 50 to as many as 95. The impression conveyed is that these ASDF officers are heir to the “young officers” of an earlier era who exploited ideas of a “Showa restoration” in an effort to accelerate Japanese rearmament and expansion in the 1930s. The difference is that the uniformed officers of today are supposed to be under “civilian (bureaucratic and parliamentary) control,” not in spiritual rebellion against the nation’s peace constitution. It is notable, however, that the civilian bureaucrats in the Defense Ministry, six of whom have also had their knuckles lightly rapped, initially hesitated to discipline Tamogami and his followers.

Writing on the theme, “Was Japan an Aggressor Nation?”, Tamogami argued the following: * Japanese colonial and semi-colonial rule, based on legal treaties, was “very moderate” in nature and beneficial to Koreans, Taiwanese, and Chinese alike. To defend these legally-recognized positions Japan waged justifiable wars.

* It was the Comintern, according to Soviet intelligence sources, and not the Kwantung Army that might have engineered the assassination of the Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin in 1928, which set the stage for Japan to take over all of Manchuria.

 *Japan never waged an illegal war of aggression in China starting in 1931, or elsewhere in the European and American colonies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific a decade later. * Manchukuo, unlike the Western colonies where racism was the basis of rule, really was a bastion of racial tolerance; so too was imperial Japan.

 * The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party played an evil role in the Japan-China War, manipulating Chiang Kai-shek to attack Japan.

 * President Franklin D. Roosevelt “very carefully” entrapped Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor after Comintern spies, such as Harry Dexter White in the Treasury Department, wrote the “Hull Note” that helped “manipulate President Roosevelt and draw [Japan] into a war with the United States.”

* “Had Japan “not fought the Greater East Asia War at that time,” it could not “have experienced the world of racial equality that we have today.” Indeed, without the War of Greater East Asia, Japan might have become “a white nation’s colony.”

In sum, Tamogami concluded, “what this country has done is wonderful.” Toward the end of his essay, citing many limitations on Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, he stresses that it should be allowed to exercise the right of collective self-defense—the implication being that it could then assist allies under attack, something that would obviously necessitate constitutional revision.

 

Clearly, true and false are not issues for Tamogami; belief in a “normal” (war-waging) state and more voice for the professional officer class are. The General tampers with facts; he uses evidence selectively; he cherry-picks international law when it suits his purpose; and he omits any mention of figures on Asian or Japanese civilian and military deaths from the wars of the 1930s and early ‘40s. His aim is to forge a body of activist officers who will participate in political combat, promoting the “true” perspective on history, even if it is not factually true for the particular historical period he cares about.

 

But none of his assertions are in any way new. For more than half a century, high ranking civilian and military officials have repeatedly made statements that provoked domestic and international controversy--either for speaking with a forked tongue on issues of war responsibility, or for reiterating, often unconsciously, crudely nationalistic sentiments of the type that Tamogami expressed. Such incidents reflect badly on the intellectual quality of the officials involved. They touch off storms of political debate within Japan and breed distrust of Japan in China, Korea, and other nations that experienced Japanese occupation. But they also serve to heighten popular vigilance against the danger of domestic militarism. Regrettably, comparable effects are seldom produced by policies initiated by Japan’s security alliance partner, the United States, whose endless war crusades and entrenched militarism have distorted national life and undermined international order. 

 

What then are we to make of Tamogami’s views? Put aside his ignorance of history, international law, the September 8 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, and his misinterpretation of sources and documents such as Sec. of State Cordell Hull’s memorandum of November 26, 1941. Is Tamogami motivated by a sense of wounded self-esteem and wrong inflicted by the US and its allies on Japan after its military and ideological defeat in 1945? Is this the reason why he is unable to recognize the many unjust acts and countless crimes committed by Japan in the course of its colonialism and invasion of neighboring states? Consider, for a moment, questions of hypocrisy and double standards in assessing the actions of Japan, the United States, and other nations that went to war throughout the twentieth century.

 

In 1945, the US and the Soviet Union took the lead in establishing the legal nomenclature of war crimes and the principles for adjudicating them and punishing offenders. At the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Tokyo (1946-8), a small number of Japanese leaders were prosecuted and punished for the crime of aggression and for war crimes in the narrow sense. But the problem of European, American, and Japanese colonialism was ignored. And the war crimes of the Allies, which culminated in the American terrorist bombing of sixty-four Japanese cities and the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were also never adjudicated. During the IMT, attempts by American and Japanese defense attorneys to raise these issues were rejected out of hand.

Moreover, the United States helped Britain, France, and The Netherlands to restore their respective colonial empires by waging war to destroy the national independence movements of their former colonial subjects. While these colonial powers were professing to be defenders of civilization, sitting in judgment of Japan for pursuing policies of aggression, they themselves were continuing to commit comparable offenses.

 

Some Japanese conservatives can neither forgive nor forget this Western hypocrisy. For them, all distorted (i.e. “official” or “victor propaganda”) versions of Japan’s modern past trace back to the Tokyo trial. They also believe the Japanese defendants at Tokyo were denied a fair hearing. When the occupation ended in 1952 and Japan regained its formal independence, a tiny minority rejected the Tokyo trial because they could see only its negative, not its many positive sides. They  began to commemorate and idealize one of the three dissenting judges on the tribunal, Radhabinod Pal. The Indian nationalist judge had been a partisan sympathizer of the Japanese military. He rejected the charge of aggression against Japan’s wartime leaders and sought their acquittal on all counts. For Pal, the real enemy in Asia was the Western White Man. Ever since that time the castigation of the Tokyo IMT’s findings has been a fixed element in Japanese right-wing thought. This is not to deny that in prosecuting Japanese war criminals the victor nations erred in key respects. One was the issue of colonialism; another was the failure to indict Emperor Hirohito, who, alone among Japan’s leaders, was at the center of events during the whole war-period. Yet Hirohito was never even questioned or made to bear moral responsibility for the war, though several of his most loyal subjects were executed or imprisoned on his account.  

 

Tamogami is not alone in defending Japanese colonial rule and holding other far-right views of early 20^th century Japanese history. But for such ideas to dominate, they must be taught in the nation’s schools and universities, widely disseminated among a majority of voters by Japanese journalists, writers, and other opinion-makers, and overcome a political-culture supportive of the peace constitution. In today’s Japan none of these conditions yet obtain. Editorial comment in the wake of Tamogami’s dismissal from office suggests that truthful views of Japan’s wars of aggression from 1931 to ’45 are widely recognized. Mainstream Japanese political culture rejects the fringe ideas associated with Yasukuni Shrine and its history Museum, and articulated here by the General.

 

Nevertheless, the voting public remains divided on issues of war remembrance. Many politicians in the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, including Prime Minister Aso, share Tamogami’s shallow nationalistic sentiments, as do writers for Fuji Sankei and its affiliated media outlets. Most of these people, however, refrain from publicly expressing their sentiments on highly contentious issues such as implicitly rejecting the verdicts of the Tokyo trial or calling for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense in violation of its Constitution.

 

Suppose, however, in the coming decade, powerfully situated individuals with historical consciousness similar to Tamogami’s came to prevail among Japan’s governing elites and their advisers. Could Japan experience the reign of extremist foreign policy ideas comparable to those of the American neo-conservatives and neo-liberals whose ideas developed over a span of three decades before reaching their extreme expression in the policies of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies? Could something similar happen in Japan?

 

Tamogami says he is uninterested in weakening Japan’s commitment to the US-Japan Security Treaty [AMPO], or Japan’s ties to other Asian countries. He draws an analogy between America, the militaristic superpower that he calls the “parent,” and Japan, its “child.” Japanese staff officers who conform to his way of thinking imagine they can put this “parent-child” relationship on a more equitable basis by jettisoning civilian control, eliminating the Defense Ministry’s “Operational Policy Bureau,” staffed by civilian bureaucrats, and allowing “mostly uniformed officers” to “manage SDF units under the defense minister.”

 

But the real problem with the US-Japan security relationship is that it is a poison injected into the arteries of Japan’s political system, continually weakening Japan’s commitment to its constitutional ideals. As long as this relic of World War II and the Cold War remains, Japan will have difficulty remaining a peace state, dealing with the criminality of its lost war, and developing an omni-directional rather than US-centered foreign policy. To defend Article 9 of the peace constitution without, at the same time, confronting AMPO is to do the work of Tamogami and people who think like him.

 

One final consideration: it is most unlikely that Pentagon officials would really welcome a Japan that undid constitutional restraints on the growth of its militarism, and acquired offensive weapons systems in order to become a “normal” (war-waging) state.  Conversely, it isn’t clear what Japan’s leaders would do if, in the near term, the “parent” escalated its failed colonial-wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and pressured Japan to involve itself more deeply in them. Social Democratic Party leader Fukushima Mizuho understood the problem correctly, however, when she linked the SDF’s expanding role in support of America’s wars to the spread of beliefs “within the Defense Ministry that Japan’s wartime acts did not constitute aggression.”

 

http://apjjf.org/-Herbert-P.-Bix/2945/article.html

 

 

SDF officers tussle with civil servants for bigger role in drafting next three-year operation plan

The Japan Times: 22 February 2016

Senior Self-Defense Forces officers are demanding a bigger role in drafting the next overall operation plan, in what is viewed as a power struggle with civilian bureaucrats in the Defense Ministry, according to sources close to the matter.
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The bureaucrats have so far refused, out of concern that uniformed SDF personnel could further extend their influence and reverse the power relationship following the enactment of laws last June that removed some of the control that civilian officials had over the SDF, the sources said Sunday.
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The legal change put uniformed SDF personnel on an equal footing with civilian bureaucrats in assisting the defense minister. The next overall operation plan for the SDF will reflect for the first time the contentious security laws enacted last year that expand the types of roles Japanese troops can perform overseas.  The law will enter into force in March.  The operation plan is revised every three years.
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It will also take into account Japan-US defense cooperation guidelines that were revised last April to expand the scope of bilateral cooperation and expand the SDF's role abroad.
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Under the legal revision last June, a ministry bureau that had exercised control over the SDF's basic activities was abolished and its functions were partly incorporated by the Joint Staff.
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According to the sources, the senior SDF officials have requested a significant transfer of authority in formulating the overall operation plan.  Before the legal amendment, they were allowed to work on it only after defense bureaucrats had developed the basic policy.
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Under the current operation plan, the Joint Staff has taken command of daily SDF operations.  But with the abolition of the ministry bureau, the SDF officials claim they should also have the authority to devise basic plans and seek the defense minister's approval.
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However, civilian defense officials maintain the ministry's Defense Policy Bureau, which has taken over some of the functions of the abolished section, should continue to devise basic policy and seek the minister's approval.

Seamen's union protests plan to make civilian ship workers SDF reservists

Seamen's union protests plan to make civilian ship workers SDF reservists
The Mainichi: 30 January 2016

Though the Defense Ministry told that they do “not force anyone” this time, if LDP (leading party in Japan) will win the election in this summer, they will proceed to revise the constitution. Passing the emergency bill (which allows PM to declare the state of emergency) is their priority. Thereafter the government can force ship crews to become SDF reservists.
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The All Japan Seamen's Union protested a plan by the Ministry of Defense to make civilian ship workers reserve Self-Defense Forces (SDF) members to be called on in times of emergency, at a press conference in Tokyo on Jan. 29. The union released a statement calling the plan "de facto conscription that is unacceptable." While the ministry says it will "not force anyone" to act as an SDF member, the... union argues that there will be "pressure" to become one.
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The union says that in response to their opposition, they were told by a senior ministry official, "We will not force any ship workers to become SDF reservists." However, Morita says, "Nobody became a seaman in order to go to an area of battle. We can easily imagine that there will be invisible pressure from the employing companies or the government (to agree to act as an SDF reservist.)"
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A senior union official at the press conference said, "Ship crews work as teams, and they can't run a ship if even one person is missing. Will people be able to refuse to become an SDF reservist when others on the ship have agreed to do so? The ministry is asking the ferry companies to have as many of their seamen as possible become SDF reservists." In the Pacific War, most of Japan's private ships and crew members were conscripted, and over 60,000 of them died. Morita said, "We can't repeat that tragedy."

http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160130/p2a/00m/0na/011000c

New Security Bills which allow Collective Self Defence is passed

Japan’s defense reform tarnished by low public support, unconvincing sales pitch  
From Japan Times:  16 September, 2015 

The government’s struggle to pass a pair of controversial security bills has made history in more ways than one. But the effort has failed in an important respect: to win public support. The ruling camp has now spent more than 200 hours debating the bills in both chambers of the Diet, the longest such deliberation since the war, government officials have said.

Still, Prime... Minister Shinzo Abe’s failure to win the support of the nation represents what some call one of the worst political blunders in the postwar period.  Despite the record-breaking deliberations, opinion polls by media outlets consistently show around 60 percent of voters opposing the bills, with some 80 percent of people complaining that the government has yet to provide “sufficient” explanation as to why they are needed.  The ruling camp now aims to have the bills clear the Upper House as early as Thursday night.

“The government has failed in convincing (the nation)” Katsuya Okada, president of the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition force, said during an NHK debate Sunday. The polls, he added, show the nation simply cannot accept the use of the right to collective self-defense. “About 30 percent are for and 60 percent are against the bills. This situation has not changed” throughout the Diet deliberations, Okada said. Lawmakers have lived and breathed the bills since May.

The core element of the two bills, which Abe submitted to expand the legal scope of overseas operations by the Self-Defense Forces, is to allow the nation to use the right of collective self-defense, or the right to attack a third party that has assaulted an ally even if Japan itself is not under attack.  Opponents say some of the wording in the bills is ambiguous and that this could allow the government to stretch the interpretation, rendering the war-renouncing Constitution toothless.

Meanwhile the contingencies Abe has presented have repeatedly changed shape, only deepening anxiety among voters. “It’s true, support has not spread yet,” Abe acknowledged during a Upper House session Monday.  Under the Constitution, Japan has been allowed to use force for self-defense only if the nation itself is attacked by an enemy.  But under the bills, Japan would be allowed to attack a third country to support an ally nation — presumably the United States — if three conditions are met: that Japan’s survival is threatened, that there is no alternative, and that the use of force is kept to “the minimum necessary.”

More precisely, according to Abe, the first condition refers to a situation “that threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” Opponents say the meanings of such abstract words are not clearly defined and the bills are susceptible to over-interpretation — possibly expanding the scope of joint operations with the U.S. military.

Many questions remain unanswered.  Would disruption of oil imports to Japan amid a Middle East crisis allow Japan to engage in a joint military operation with the U.S.? Would loss of economic benefits for Japan alone meet the conditions to use the right of collective self-defense?  Abe has only responded to such questions with even more abstract phrases: The government would “make judgments from a comprehensive viewpoint by considering if it will cause a critical impact on people’s lives,” for example.

To some, this is unacceptable. “The government says we should leave the decision on starting a war to a ‘comprehensive judgment’ by the government. We should not do that,” Okada said.  He has called for writing into law the prerequisites for force to be used.  One scenario that Abe initially touted as meeting the three conditions was the mining of the Hormuz Strait by Iran, an act that could hit oil shipments to Japan.  But experts say such a blockage is unlikely because Iran itself is reliant on the strait for its own oil exports. Abe later admitted that he did not consider it a realistic scenario.

Then Abe started pointing to a possible military crisis in the South China Sea, despite earlier saying such a situation would be unlikely to affect Japanese trade because cargo ships and oil tankers can bypass the area. The apparent contradiction only deepened suspicion that his primary goal was to pull the teeth from the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution, and that his talk of scenarios was just a way to bring that about.

“We suspect (the ruling camp) has developed its argument just to open the way for the use of the right to collective self-defense,” Tadatomo Yoshida, the Social Democratic Party, said during Sunday’s TV debate.  Abe and many experts have, however, argued that the Japan-U.S. military alliance would be critically damaged if Tokyo refuses to defend the U.S. military in a crisis threatening Japan. Under the security treaty, the U.S. must defend Japan, but Japanese troops do not have to defend the U.S. military. Tokyo is obliged, however, to grant Washington routine use of military bases.

“It makes a great deal of sense for Japan to strengthen the Japan-U.S. military alliance” by enacting the bills, said Koji Murata, professor of international politics and president of Doshisha University in Kyoto.  Murata pointed out that China’s economic and military power is rapidly growing, while American influence in the Asia-Pacific region has shrunk in recent years. “If you ask the opinions of experts on security affairs — not constitutional scholars — I believe many will have positive views about the bills in question,” Murata told a public hearing at the Upper House on July 23.

Abe, meanwhile, is trying not to exacerbate tensions with Beijing and has stopped short of citing a clash with China as a possible scenario during his Diet contributions. He has referred instead only obliquely to its growing military power.  Indeed, China has been the No. 1 trading partner with Japan in recent years and it would be too risky, both economically and politically, for Abe to provoke Beijing by openly discussing a scenario of war with China.

Instead he has cited North Korea’s nuclear ballistic missile and nuclear weapons development as one of the main military threats to the nation. His decision to highlight this rather than the threat from China has contributed to the confusion.  Meanwhile, even with the enactment of the bills, Japan still would be unable to fully exercise the right of collective self-defense, although the United Nations bestows the right on all member countries. Senior government officials maintain that no major country attaches such strict conditions to using the right of collective self-defense.

During an Upper House session Monday, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida pointed out that among the U.S., Britain and Australia, none has laws that “set conditions for use of the right to self-defense.”
“I believe the three conditions would work as an unparalleled brake” to Japan’s use of the right of collective self-defense, argued Masahisa Sato, a former SDF officer turned Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker, during the same Upper House session. Abe appears to believe that time is on his side, although the first political test for him will come in next summer’s Upper House election.

The Self-Defense Forces, which were set up in 1954, were initially dismissed by the general public and the vast majority of constitutional scholars as unconstitutional. Now, however, the forces enjoy widespread support from the vast majority of the public. Mainstream, liberal intellectuals and students also opposed the revision in 1960 of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, which was proposed and pushed by then Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, Abe’s grandfather and role model. Likewise, a majority of the nation now admits that the treaty was and is vital for peace and security of Japan. “As times passes, (support) will no doubt spread among the public,” Abe told the Upper House session Monday.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/16/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-defense-reform-tarnished-low-public-support-unconvincing-sales-pitch/#.VsJurP1FDZ5

Also please refer to :
Japan set to pass security bills despite widespread anger From Yahoo News
http://news.yahoo.com/controversial-security-bills-approved-japan-parliament-vote-jiji-175238669.html?soc_src=mediacontentsharebuttons&soc_trk=fb


 

Japanese Soldiers train at National Training Center for first time

 

According to the photo journalist who witnessed this Japanese SDF-US military joint training (2014 January-February)  , the site of the training was a big desert with the setting of mosque, Arabic village, Arabian actors who played the role of residents, and security expert who played the role of insurgents. Also, heavy military equipment and US staffs well experienced at Middle East were ready

Abe government repeatedly explain that proposed security bill is necessary for the “critical” Self Defense condition mainly due to mounting tension between East Asian neighbors and risks of tankers supplying oil to Japan could be attacked at Strait of Hormuz. (The definition of “critical” is vague in draft. Opponents asked to define it concretely but no favorable response. ) At the national Diet, the member of the opposite party asked if such setting is related to “critical” Self Defense of Japan. Abe explained as “as per US-Japan security treaty, if Japanese land is attacked, US troop and Japanese SDF cooperate to defense.” However, there is no such big desert with mosque exists in Japanese land.

Earlier, the details of this training were available at the official home page of US Army, but not available any more. The member of the Opposite party requested the information disclosure to the Ministry of Defense officially, but the many parts of the documents given in response were painted in black. Specific secret protection law became effective a few months before this training.

Ministry of Defense in Japan was planning Economic Conscription System.

Japanese constitution Article 18 says, " No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited. " Some of the opponents of collective self defence bills concerned Abe government, which made "controversial" interpretation of pacifist Article 9 to pass the bill, may revive conscription system. The government firmly denied and some rightists argue that their concern is megalomania. However, the Ministry of Defence was scheming "SDF (Self Defence Force) Internship program" targeting to private sector freshman as below. Considering Japanese labour market situation and social norm, it is difficult for freshman to reject such order from employers.

(quote)

This is what has been discussed at Japanese Diet with regards to recruitment of Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The current administration is trying to make SDF more like a standing forces so that they can send them even to the Middle East as the US demands. Because of this political climate, many young officers are quitting SDF.

In order to stop losing young officers, they came up with a new plan to collaborate private sectors. Here is my translation of the below Japanese chart:

[Long-term Internship Program at Japan Self-defense Forces] Deal between Japanese DOD/SDF and private sectors, in which they mutually utilize human resources.

How this program works:

1) Private sectors send their freshmen to SDF for two years as interns

2) SDF accepts them as “limited term” interns.

3) SDF treats them as SDF officers until the end of their term. They can obtain certain certificates as they serve at SDF.

4) After the term, they will return to their original employers.

5) During their internship, their salary will be paid by the government.

Merits for corporations:

1) SDF-trained “fit” personnels can be obtained every year.

2) SDF provides trainings focusing on “basic education as an adult” with teamwork, and proactive skills.

3) Corporations can contribute to the nation’s defense.

Merits for DOD:

1) They’ve been suffering with recruiting new officers for a long time. This new program will provide them with continuous flow of young and capable personnels every year.

2) They can avoid competition with private sectors in recruiting freshmen. This is win-win situation for both DOD and corporations.

3) By developing better relationship with private sectors, DOD may be able to use former interns as “reserve” in the future.

To do list before stating this program:

1) DOD needs to establish a model case of this program.

2) DOD needs to plan an exam and other frame works.

3) DOD needs to provide private sectors with certain incentives.

One of comments is saying: DOD is planning a new type of recruiting more officers! Freshman employees go to SDF as interns for two years. They cannot refuse this “corporate order” and they may be sent to combat zones in case of wars. The government may offer subsidies and easy access to winning in open bids of public projects, to corporations in exchange with getting their employees as interns. This is a horrifying new system!

(unquote)

https://www.popularresistance.org/japan-thousands-protest-war-law/

Speech: Japan's Proactive Contribution to Peace: What it Means in Development (JICA)

Speech: Japan's Proactive Contribution to Peace: What it Means in Development | About JICA | JICA

jica.go.jp

 

As anyone familiar with Japanese politics knows, the current focus on Japan's security policy is the parliamentary deliberation on peace and security-related laws that allow limited exercises of the collective self-defense rights. The proposed legislation reflects the change in the government interpretation of the Constitution made about one year ago. Once passed, these laws could strengthen the alliance with the United States, enable quick responses to contingencies such as crises over remote islands, and make Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations more flexible than before. As such, these laws are in line with what Prime Minister Abe calls "Japan's proactive contribution to peace."

 Today, I would like to argue that Japan's proactive contribution to peace is not limited to the activities of the Self Defense Forces and the military functions of the Japan-U.S. alliance. I would like to stress that development cooperation has also played and continues to play an important role in contributing to peace proactively. Obviously, development cooperation does not directly contribute to the defense of Japan or to the strengthening of the alliance, but it could improve the conditions of international security by helping fragile and conflict-affected countries in their socio-economic development as well as their peace-building efforts.

To illustrate what I mean, I would like to share five examples from JICA's activities.
First, Afghanistan. Japan has been committed to Afghanistan's development since 2001 and has provided 5.8 billion US dollars in total as of April 2015. We have assisted various sectors, including infrastructure, agriculture and rural development, public health and education. As we believe that human resource development is critical for good governance and socio-economic development, we are providing scholarships to 500 Afghan officials over a 6 year span to attend graduate schools in Japan.

My second example is our response to the refugee crisis caused by the Syrian civil war. We support Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, all neighboring countries that are receiving large Syrian refugee populations. In Jordan, JICA is working with the Jordanian government to help both refugees and host communities meet their basic needs and protect their dignity. In terms of direct refugee support, we have provided post-traumatic care to children. We pay particular attention to the most vulnerable among them, notably children with disabilities. We are also providing medical equipment and school supplies to host communities. Japan also recently pledged to extend an additional ODA loan worth 200 million US dollars to Jordan for budget support to help the central government cope with this humanitarian crisis.

In Lebanon, we are planning to start a technical cooperation project to support the education of young refugees. Currently, the Lebanese government is making heroic efforts to provide elementary and middle school education to Syrian children through two-shift operations. Using the same school facilities, they have a morning shift for Lebanese children and an afternoon one for Syrian children. We plan to provide additional facilities and administrative assistance.
 Turkey is also bearing the burden of the influx of Syrian refugees, especially in the provinces bordering Syria. That is why we have decided to extend a 375 million US dollars ODA loan to the Government of Turkey to improve local utility infrastructure, including water supply and sewage systems in the provinces bordering Syria.

Third, South Sudan. Japan deploys Self Defense Forces as UN peacekeepers in South Sudan. In addition, JICA has been working there since before the formal independence of the country, providing support to socio-economic development activities. We repaired many small bridges destroyed during the war in Juba, built a vocational training center, and repaired port facilities on the Nile River. We are now building a bridge over the Nile to replace the only existing bridge, a very fragile one that could collapse at any moment.

The fourth example is our post-disaster relief and reconstruction activities following the two earthquakes that shook Nepal in last April and May. We immediately dispatched Japan Disaster Relief Teams for rescue and medical operations. In addition to these emergency humanitarian operations, we started discussions with the Nepali government on full-fledged reconstruction and recovery by sending civil engineering experts in early May. Japan pledged to extend very concessional ODA loans worth 260 million US dollars for housing, school and other community facilities' reconstruction. Our staff is working hard so that housing reconstruction can start before the winter sets in there. Seismologists point out that there is still pent-up seismic pressure in the region surrounding Kathmandu. Though Kathmandu was not damaged very much this time, we believe that it is important to develop a reconstruction program to make the capital city more resilient against future earthquakes. We should not forget that Nepal is also a post-conflict country. It is important that the country be rebuilt inclusively so that reconstruction process becomes an opportunity to cooperate rather than become a source of renewed conflict.

The final example is Mindanao, in the Philippines. As you know, Mindanao has suffered from a prolonged conflict since the 1960s. There have been a series of attempts made to bring about lasting peace. Japan started its serious engagement in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century. Japan has participated in the International Contact Group and sent JICA staff to the International Monitoring Team (IMT). Our staff has acted as civilian members of the IMT and has coordinated our socio-economic cooperation with both the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Based on such coordination, in 2006 JICA started a project called J-BIRD, Japan-Bansamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development. J-BIRD has provided community facilities, schools, vocational training for women, and farm roads in areas controlled by the government as well as by the MILF. In 2011, a breakthrough meeting secretly took place between President Aquino and MILF chairman Murado in Narita, Japan. The comprehensive peace agreement was finally reached in March 2014. Now the basic law to cement peace is under deliberation in the parliament. There are many tasks that need to be implemented for lasting peace, but Japan's diplomatic efforts and JICA's development cooperation have contributed to creating an environment that promotes peace in Mindanao. We are now engaged in projects of human capacity development for decommissioned soldiers of the MILF and training of future administrators of the Bansamoro government. We are planning more extensive and long-term development projects as well as quick-impact projects to let people realize that peace has finally come.